Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters

In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Errol Lord
University of Pennsylvania
The post-Gettier literature contained many views that tried to solve the Gettier problem by appealing to the notion of defeat. Unfortunately, all of these views are false. The failure of these views greatly contributed to a general distrust of reasons in epistemology. However, reasons are making a comeback in epistemology, both in general and in the context of the Gettier problem. There are two main aims of this paper. First, I will argue against a natural defeat based resolution of the Gettier problem. Second, I will defend my own defeat based solution. This solution appeals to a modal anti-luck condition. I will argue that this condition captures anti-luck intuitions and has virtues that rival modal anti-luck conditions lack.
Keywords Gettier Problem  Modal Condition on Knowledge  Safety
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