Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):202-206 (2019)

Authors
Errol Lord
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling. By Sinhababu Neil.
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqy033
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