Abstract

Thomas Hobbes has often been portrayed as supporting a 'realist' view of international relations—a view in which everything is permitted among states, in which the insecurity of the international sphere justifies states in unrestrainedly pursuing the national interest. Yet, as this paper aims to show, this interpretation is not without difficulties. It overshadows both the advantages that Hobbes believes can be gained from interstate cooperation and the fundamental role he attributes to a superior common authority in making cooperative ventures stable and lasting. More specifically, this paper brings into relief the important limitations that Hobbes's natural law theory places on sovereigns' freedom of action. It also argues that the most frequently advanced disanalogies between the Hobbesian interpersonal and interstate states of nature fail to explain why it would be irrational for Hobbesian sovereigns to submit to a supra-state authority; the main obstacle is instead to be found in Hobbes's absolutist conception of sovereignty