Noûs 30 (2):242-61 (1996)

Authors
Eric Lormand
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
There is not a uniform kind of consciousness common to all conscious mental states: beliefs, emotions, perceptual experiences, pains, moods, verbal thoughts, and so on. Instead, we need a distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal consciousness. As if consciousness simpliciter were not mysterious enough, philosophers have recently focused their worries on phenomenal consciousness, the kind that explains or constitutes there being "something it
Keywords Consciousness  Mental States  Metaphysics  Mood  Phenomena
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DOI 10.2307/2216295
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The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
Introspective Humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.

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