Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic

In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 126-145 (2020)
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Abstract

Errol Lord explores the boundaries of epistemic normativity. He argues that we can understand these better by thinking about which mental states are competitors in rationality’s competition. He argues that belief, disbelief, and two kinds of suspension of judgment are competitors. Lord shows that there are non-evidential reasons for suspension of judgment. One upshot is an independent motivation for a certain sort of pragmatist view of epistemic rationality.

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Errol Lord
University of Pennsylvania

Citations of this work

Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.
Agnosticism as settled indecision.Verena Wagner - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):671-697.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.
Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.

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