In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 126-145 (2020)

Authors
Errol Lord
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
Errol Lord explores the boundaries of epistemic normativity. He argues that we can understand these better by thinking about which mental states are competitors in rationality’s competition. He argues that belief, disbelief, and two kinds of suspension of judgment are competitors. Lord shows that there are non-evidential reasons for suspension of judgment. One upshot is an independent motivation for a certain sort of pragmatist view of epistemic rationality.
Keywords Suspension of Judgment  Reasons for Belief  Pragmatism
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.
Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Independence of (in)Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.
Agnosticism as Settled Indecision.Verena Wagner - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

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