Abstract

Part I aims at the constructive establishment of a concept of the self to undergird the theologically indispensable concept of the soul. It begins with a judgment theory of cognition, from which a "substantival" subject is extracted. Having a creative power constituting it a free and responsible agent, this subject is related through moral consciousness and will to an objective moral order. Part II, concerned with the problem of God and the objective validity of religious belief, begins in religion as such, where theism is held to recommend itself strongly under a symbolic interpretation, then develops a metaphysical support for the central tenets of this creed. The guiding methodological convictions are revealed in a major emphasis on introspection, a firm rejection of the sensationalist conception of experience, and an insistence on the primacy of thought over words. Professor Campbell has here carried on the tradition of British Idealism and Rationalism with insight and ingenuity, in dignified and deliberate defiance of the prevailing empiricist and linguistic dogmas. Despite its high rank among similar efforts, however, this work does not represent a real advance beyond the recent impasses, nor a resolution of the genuine epistemological and methodological enigmas plaguing contemporary philosophy. --L. K. B.