Analysis 69 (1):63-69 (2009)

Authors
Roberto Loss
Complutense University of Madrid
Abstract
Joseph Keim Campbell has recently criticized Peter van Inwagen's Third Argument against compatibilism for its reliance on the existence of a remote past. In response, Anthony Brueckner has offered a new version of the Third Argument showing that determinism and free will are incompatible for all times t relative to which there is a past . In this paper I argue that although Brueckner's retooled argument fails to prove anything in favour of incompatibilism, its conclusion can be exploited to provide another version of van Inwagen's original argument that doesn't rely on the existence of past times, thus withstanding Campbell's criticism
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ann010
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References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
Past, present and future.Arthur Prior - 1967 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 157:476-476.
An Essay on Free Will.Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.

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Citations of this work BETA

Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
Arguments for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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