“Putting the linguistic method in its place”: Mackie’s distinction between conceptual and factual analysis

Abstract

Early in his career and in critical engagement with ordinary language philosophy, John Mackie developed the roots of a methodology that would be fundamental to his thinking: Mackie argues that we need to clearly separate the conceptual analysis which determines the meaning of an ordinary term and the factual analysis which is concerned with the question what, if anything, our language corresponds to in the world. I discuss how Mackie came to develop this distinction and how central ideas of his philosophy are based on it. Using the examples of Mackie’s moral skepticism and his work on Locke’s theory of perception I show how his methodology opens the door to error theories but can also support more positive claims. Finally, I put Mackie’s methodology in a historical perspective and argue that in cases like the Gettier debate, we can use it to cast light on the vagueness of the underlying methodology in some philosophical debates.

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Tammo Lossau
Ashoka University

References found in this work

The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
The Miracle of Theism.John Leslie Mackie - 1982 - Philosophy 58 (225):414-416.

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Citations of this work

Mackie and the Meaning of Moral Terms.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (1):1-13.

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