Have Elephant Seals Refuted Aristotle? Nature, Function, and Moral Goodness

Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):353-375 (2012)
Abstract
An influential strand of neo-Aristotelianism, represented by writers such as Philippa Foot, holds that moral virtue is a form of natural goodness in human beings, analogous to deep roots in oak trees or keen vision in hawks. Critics, however, have argued that such a view cannot get off the ground, because the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity is untenable in light of a Darwinian account of living things. This criticism has been developed most fully by William Fitzpatrick in his book Teleology and the Norms of Nature . In this paper, I defend the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity, focusing on Fitzpatrick's arguments. I argue that a natural goodness view is not impugned by an evolutionary account. Nor can neo-Aristotelian life form judgments be replaced by an evolutionary view of living things
Keywords biological function   Thompson   Fitzpatrick   natural goodness   moral goodness   Foot
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1163/174552412X625727
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 25,687
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Human Nature and Moral Sprouts: Mencius on the Pollyanna Problem.Richard T. Kim - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism and the Indeterminacy Objection.Scott Woodcock - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (1):20-41.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-07-26

Total downloads

84 ( #58,992 of 2,146,214 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #75,470 of 2,146,214 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums