Morality, Accountability and the Wrong Kind of Reasons

Utilitas 28 (1):28-40 (2016)
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Abstract

In The Second Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall makes a new argument against consequentialism, appealing to: the conceptual tie between obligation and accountability, and the for holding others accountable. I argue that Darwall's argument, as it stands, fails against indirect consequentialism, because it relies on a confusion between our being right to establish practices, and our having a right to do so. I also explore two ways of augmenting Darwall's argument. However, while the second of these ways is more promising than the first, neither provides a convincing argument against indirect consequentialism

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