Moral Implications from Cognitive (Neuro)Science? No Clear Route

Ethics 127 (1):241-256 (2016)
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Abstract

Joshua Greene argues that cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics in two ways, the “direct route” and the “indirect route.” Greene illustrates the direct route with a debunking explanation of the inclination to condemn all incest. The indirect route is an updated version of Greene’s argument that dual-process moral psychology gives support for consequentialism over deontology. I consider each of Greene’s arguments, and I argue that neither succeeds. If there is a route from cognitive (neuro)science to ethics, Greene has not found it.

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Author's Profile

Micah Lott
Boston College

Citations of this work

In Search of Greene's Argument.Norbert Paulo - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (1):38-58.
Axiological aspects of moral and legal decision-making.I. M. Hoian - 2019 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 16:66-77.

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