Radical Enactivism, Wittgenstein and the cognitive gap

Adaptive Behavior 22 (5):350-359 (2014)
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Abstract

REC or Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (Hutto and Myin, 2013) involves the claim that certain forms of mentality do not involve informational content and are instead to be equated with temporally and spatially extended physical interactions between an agent and the environment. REC also claims however that other forms of mentality do involve informational content and are scaffolded by socially and linguistically enabled practices. This seems to raise what can be called a cognitive gap question, namely, how do non-contentful behaviours give rise to contentful behaviours? In this paper, I show how REC can tackle a certain understanding of this question. I argue that if REC were to endorse claims made by the later Wittgenstein, then REC could deny that there is any (synchronous) gap in our intelligent behaviour.

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Victor Loughlin
University of Antwerp

Citations of this work

Wittgenstein’s Challenge to Enactivism.Victor Loughlin - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):391-404.

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