Adaptive Behavior 22 (5):350-359 (2014)

Victor Loughlin
University of Antwerp
REC or Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (Hutto and Myin, 2013) involves the claim that certain forms of mentality do not involve informational content and are instead to be equated with temporally and spatially extended physical interactions between an agent and the environment. REC also claims however that other forms of mentality do involve informational content and are scaffolded by socially and linguistically enabled practices. This seems to raise what can be called a cognitive gap question, namely, how do non-contentful behaviours give rise to contentful behaviours? In this paper, I show how REC can tackle a certain understanding of this question. I argue that if REC were to endorse claims made by the later Wittgenstein, then REC could deny that there is any (synchronous) gap in our intelligent behaviour.
Keywords REC  Radical Enactivism  Hutto and Myin  Wittgenstein  cognitive gap
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Wittgenstein’s Challenge to Enactivism.Victor Loughlin - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):391-404.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
348 ( #26,327 of 2,454,826 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #117,399 of 2,454,826 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes