Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518–536 (2004)

Abstract
Does the real difference between non-consequentialist and consequentialist theories lie in their approach to value? Non-consequentialist theories are thought either to allow a different kind of value (namely, agent-relative value) or to advocate a different response to value ('honouring' rather than 'promoting'). One objection to this idea implies that all normative theories are describable as consequentialist. But then the distinction between honouring and promoting collapses into the distinction between relative and neutral value. A proper description of non-consequentialist theories can only be achieved by including a distinction between temporal relativity and neutrality in addition to the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00370.x
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References found in this work BETA

Structures of Normative Theories.James Dreier - 1993 - The Monist 76 (1):22-40.
Non-Consequentialism and Universalizability.Philip Pettit - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):175-190.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Rejection of Consequentializing.Daniel Muñoz - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
Value and the Right Kind of Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.
Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.
Consequentialize This.Campbell Brown - 2011 - Ethics 121 (4):749-771.

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