Souls and the Location of Time in Physics IV 14, 223a16–223a29

Apeiron 44 (4):307-325 (2011)
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In Physics IV 14, 223a16-223a29 Aristotle raises two questions: (Q1) How is time related to the soul? (Q2) Why is time thought to be in everything? Aristotle's juxtaposition of these questions indicates some relation between them. I argue that Aristotle is committed to the claim that time only exists where change is countable. Aristotle must answer (Q2) in a way that doesn't conflict with this commitment. Aristotle's answer to (Q1) offers him such a way. Since time is change qua countable, time is dependent on souls capable of counting. But the thing that time is, change, is not so dependent. Likewise, time is not located in everything, but change, the substratum of time, is. This answers (Q2) in a way that's compatible with Aristotle's commitments.

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Tim Loughrist
University of North Alabama

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About time for Aristotle. [REVIEW]Stephen Makin - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):280–293.
Aristotle’s Definition of Time Is Not Circular.Tony Roark - 2003 - Ancient Philosophy 23 (2):301-318.

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