Philosophy of Science 75 (5):874-886 (2008)

Alan Love
University of Minnesota
It is a common complaint that antireductionist arguments are primarily negative. Here I describe an alternative nonreductionist epistemology based on considerations taken from multidisciplinary research in biology. The core of this framework consists in seeing investigation as coordinated around sets of problems (problem agendas) that have associated criteria of explanatory adequacy. These ideas are developed in a case study, the explanation of evolutionary innovations and novelties, which demonstrates the applicability and fruitfulness of this nonreductionist epistemological perspective. This account also bears on questions of conceptual change and theory structure in philosophy of science. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, 831 Heller Hall, 271 19th Ave. S., Minneapolis, MN 55455; e‐mail: [email protected]
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/594531
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,581
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 60 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Explanations of the Evolution of Sex: A Plurality of Local Mechanisms.Carla Fehr - 2006 - In Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino & C. Kenneth Waters (eds.), Scientific Pluralism, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 167-189.
Recent Work on Criteria for Event Identity, 1967-1979.Michael Bradie - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:29-77.
What, If Anything, is an Evolutionary Novelty?Massimo Pigliucci - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):887-898.


Added to PP index

Total views
75 ( #146,782 of 2,461,407 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #222,958 of 2,461,407 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes