Journal of Moral Education 39 (2):175-189 (2010)

Abstract
Moral sensitivity has generally been interpreted in a normative sense, as the ability to notice moral features present in a situation. This paper outlines an alternative, descriptive conception of moral sensitivity: the levels of moralisation model. This model describes four qualitatively distinct levels at which a preference can be held: no moralisation; moralisation for the self; moralisation for others; and public expression of moralisation. Empirical research supporting the existence of these levels as well as processes that move a preference across the levels are discussed. In addition, the practical utility of the model is demonstrated with regard to moral education and conflict resolution programs
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DOI 10.1080/03057241003754914
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Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
A Test for Ethical Sensitivity in Science.Henriikka Clarkeburn - 2002 - Journal of Moral Education 31 (4):439-453.

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