(draft; call for comments) The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of believing or intending and surely they are an irremovable element in constitutive aims of believing or intending. Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative (this claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative). The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of the intentional states of the human mind. Our intentional states are always correlated with our dispositions; when I refer to our ?dispositions? here, I do not mean to focus exclusively on our behavioural dispositions; I mean to include our mental dispositions as well, such as our dispositions to revise our beliefs and intentions in response to various conditions. We can hold that the normative nature of our judgement is intrinsic with our rational dispositions: the rational dispositions of our mind have essential normative properties, even if we must not identify mental properties with their normative role in mental activity.In this contest I deal with the concepts of factual ultimate aim and normative ultimate aim.
Keywords normative  ultimate aim
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

How to Be a Normative Expressivist.Michael Pendlebury - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):182-207.
The Normativity of the Intentional.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Normativism Defended.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 85--102.
How We Know What Ought to Be.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):61–84.
Against Essential Normativity of the Mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis.Sungho Choi - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):568-590.
A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions.J. McKitrick - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.


Added to PP index

Total views
171 ( #59,438 of 2,438,582 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #95,363 of 2,438,582 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes