Bioethics 27 (5):263-70 (2013)
According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuses have the same intrinsic value and moral standing as adult human beings. After giving consideration to defenders of the substance view's replies to these charges, I then critique each of them, ultimately concluding that none is successful. Of course, in order to understand all of these things – the reductio charges, defenders of the substance view's replies to them, and my criticisms of their replies – one must have a better understanding of the substance view as well as its defense. Accordingly, I address the substance view's understanding of rational moral agency as well as present its defense.
|Keywords||potential animalism moral standing intrinsic value fetus rational moral agency substance view|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Abortion, Metaphysics and Morality: A Review of Francis Beckwith's Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice. [REVIEW]N. Nobis - 2011 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (3):261-273.
Moral Agency in Other Animals.Paul Shapiro - 2006 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):357-373.
What Nature Makes of Her: Kant's Gendered Metaphysics.Inder S. Marwah - 2013 - Hypatia 28 (3):551-567.
Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach to Abortion.Lara Denis - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):117-37.
Corporate Moral Responsibility: What Can We Infer From Our Understanding of Organisations? [REVIEW]Stephen Wilmot - 2001 - Journal of Business Ethics 30 (2):161 - 169.
The Problem of Agency and the Problem of Accountability in Kant's Moral Philosophy.Iuliana Corina Vaida - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):110-137.
The Genetic Account of Moral Status: A Defense.S. Matthew Liao - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):265-277.
Added to index2012-02-03
Total downloads341 ( #8,508 of 2,177,962 )
Recent downloads (6 months)42 ( #5,754 of 2,177,962 )
How can I increase my downloads?