Bioethics 27 (5):263-70 (2013)
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Abstract |
According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the ‘substance view,’ what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency – a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuses have the same intrinsic value and moral standing as adult human beings. After giving consideration to defenders of the substance view's replies to these charges, I then critique each of them, ultimately concluding that none is successful. Of course, in order to understand all of these things – the reductio charges, defenders of the substance view's replies to them, and my criticisms of their replies – one must have a better understanding of the substance view as well as its defense. Accordingly, I address the substance view's understanding of rational moral agency as well as present its defense.
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Keywords | potential animalism moral standing intrinsic value fetus rational moral agency substance view |
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DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01954.x |
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References found in this work BETA
The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life.Frances Kamm - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):273-280.
The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity.Patrick Lee & Robert P. George - 2008 - In Adam Schulman (ed.), Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. [President's Council on Bioethics. pp. 173-193.
The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity.Patrick Lee & Robert P. George - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (2):173-193.
Abortion: Three Perspectives.Michael Tooley, Celia Wolf-Devine, Philip E. Devine & Alison M. Jaggar - 2009 - Oup Usa.
View all 6 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Prolife Hypocrisy: Why Inconsistency Arguments Do Not Matter.Nicholas Colgrove, Bruce Philip Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics (Online First):1-6.
Cursed Lamp: The Problem of Spontaneous Abortion.William Simkulet - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (11):784-791.
The Inconsistency Argument: Why Apparent Pro-Life Inconsistency Undermines Opposition to Induced Abortion.William Simkulet - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics:medethics-2020-107207.
View all 15 citations / Add more citations
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