The Substance View: A Critique (Part 3)

Bioethics 31 (4):305-312 (2017)

Authors
Rob Lovering
College of Staten Island (CUNY)
Abstract
In my articles ‘The Substance View: A Critique’ and ‘The Substance View: A Critique,’ I raise objections to the substance view, a theory of intrinsic value and moral standing defended by a number of contemporary moral philosophers, including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christopher Tollefsen, and Francis Beckwith. In part one of my critique of the substance view, I raise reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among other human beings. In part two, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of that conclusion. Here, in part three, I raise objections to Henrik Friberg-Fernros's attempt to rebut some of the aforementioned objections.
Keywords intrinsic value  human fetus  extratheoretical moral proposition  Henrik Friberg‐Fernros  substance view  intratheoretical moral proposition  moral standing
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/bioe.12330
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Two Tragedies Argument: Two Mistakes.William Simkulet - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (8):562-564.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Substance View: A Critique.Rob Lovering - 2013 - Bioethics 27 (5):263-70.
The Ever Conscious View: A Critique.Rob Lovering - 2011 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 18 (1):90-101.
Spinoza’s Two Views of Substance.Frank Lucash - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (3):537-555.
Strange Bedfellows? Common Ground on the Moral Status Question.Shane Maxwell Wilkins - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (2):130-147.
Dualists Needn’T Be Anti-Criterialists.Duncan Matt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):945-963.
Dualists Needn’T Be Anti-Criterialists.By Matt Duncan - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
Metaphysics, Ethics and Personhood.Gregory E. Ganssle - 2005 - Faith and Philosophy 22 (3):370-376.
Moral Perception.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species.Rick O’Neil - 1997 - Environmental Ethics 19 (1):45-52.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-12-23

Total views
105 ( #81,869 of 2,286,307 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #30,365 of 2,286,307 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature