Philosophy 75 (294):571-586 (2000)

Authors
E. J. Lowe
PhD: Oxford University; Last affiliation: Durham University
Abstract
Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it is argued that various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an emergentist character, are consistent with the strongest physical causal closure principles that can plausibly be advocated.
Keywords Causation  Closure  Emergentism  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1017/S003181910000067X
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References found in this work BETA

Mind the Gap.David Papineau - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:373-89.
Interactionism and Overdetermination.Eugene O. Mills - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):105-115.
Mind the Gap.David Papineau - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):373-388.

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Citations of this work BETA

Naturalism.Davidn D. Papineau - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Taking Emergentism Seriously.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):31-46.
Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Closing in on Causal Closure.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.

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