On the alleged necessity of true identity statements

Mind 91 (364):579-584 (1982)
A highly contentious issue in recent philosophy of logic has been the question of whether there can be contingently true identity statements. In this paper I want to investigate a possible loop-hole in the standard argument of the necessitarians (i.e., those who maintain that any true identity statement is necessarily true).
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DOI 10.1093/mind/XCI.364.579
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Contingent Identity.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):486-495.

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