There are no easy problems of consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):266-71 (1995)
Abstract
This paper challenges David Chalmers' proposed division of the problems of consciousness into the `easy' ones and the `hard' one, the former allegedly being susceptible to explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms and the latter supposedly turning on the fact that experiential `qualia' resist any sort of functional definition. Such a division, it is argued, rests upon a misrepresention of the nature of human cognition and experience and their intimate interrelationship, thereby neglecting a vitally important insight of Kant. From a Kantian perspective, our capacity for conceptual thought is so inextricably bound up with our capacity for phenomenal consciousness that it is an illusion to imagine that there are any `easy' problems of consciousness, resolvable within the computational or neural paradigms
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,157
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
There is No Hard Problem of Consciousness.Kieron O'Hara & Tom Scutt - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):290-302.
The Easy Problems Ain't so Easy.David Hodgson - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):69-75.
Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):63-92.
Intentionality and Experience.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):299-318.
Chalmers' Fading and Dancing Qualla.Liam P. Dempsey - 2002 - Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.
How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2001 - In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 1.
Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):4-6.
How to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness*: Ned Block.Ned Block - 1996 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:23-34.
The Relation of Consciousness to the Material World.Max Velmans - 1995 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):255-65.
A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 381-396.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

28 ( #183,819 of 2,171,970 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #326,556 of 2,171,970 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums