Flexible property designators

Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):221-230 (2006)
Th e simple proposal about rigidity for predicates can be stated thus: a predicate is rigid if its canonical nominalization signifi es the same property across the different possible worlds. I have tried elsewhere to defend such a proposal from the trivialization problem, according to which any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be rigid. Benjamin Schnieder (2005) aims fi rst to rebut my argument that some canonical nominalizations can be fl exible, then to provide fi ve arguments to the eff ect that they are all rigid, and fi nally to propose a general explanation of why they are all rigid. I show fi rst why my argument has not been rebutted, then why Schnieder’s fi ve arguments for their rigidity all fail, and fi nally why the alleged “explanation” cannot be such, as the facts alluded to are neutral with respect to the rigidity or fl exibility of the nominalizations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,831
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity.Mark Textor - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):45-59.
A Puzzle About Properties.Berit Brogaard - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):635-650.
Are Proper Names Rigid Designators?Pierre Baumann - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (2-3):333-346.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
40 ( #143,028 of 2,214,215 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #410,028 of 2,214,215 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature