Responsabilidad y suerte moral: Circunstancias y consecuencias de la acción
Análisis Filosófico 20 (1-2):33-54 (2000)
Abstract“ Moral luck” alludes to the fact of being responsible for things over which we have no control. Typically, we have neither control over the consequences of our acts of will nor over the circumstances in which these acts are performed. The Kantian thesis on oral responsibility claims that every kind of moral responsibility claims that every kind of moral luck should be eliminated from our moral language and practice. In the case of consequences, this aim does not seem impossible. But circumstances are more difficult to avoid because the act of will itself has to be performed within the framework of circumstances that the agent cannot control at all, and these circumstances will dramatically bear on his/her responsibility. Therefore, the following anti-Kantian argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck or we accept it. If we reject it, then every attribution of responsibility becomes impossible. If we accept it, then we no longer have a good argument against consequential luck, the core of the Kantian rejection of moral luck. In this paper, I defend the Kantian position from this argument, claiming that both kinds of moral luck are relevantly different. This will, nevertheless, lead to a revision of the scope of our judgments of responsibility. They compare how someone acted with how others would act in identical 8or similar) circumstances
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Citations of this work
Responsabilidad Y suerte penal. Reflexiones sobre un argumento de Eduardo Rivera López.Tobías J. Schleider - 2011 - Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 34.
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