Friendship, Value and Interpretation

Theoria 83 (4):319-340 (2017)

Authors
Jörg Löschke
University of Zürich
Abstract
A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so-called relationships view, according to which associative duties within personal relationships arise because of the value of those relationships. Against this view, it has been argued that there can be cases of undemanding friendships, that is, genuine friendships with no associative duties. In this article, I argue that undemanding friendships do not show that associative duties are not grounded in the value of the relationship that gives rise to them by providing an interpretivist account of the normativity of friendships. I argue that friendships are complex values that need to be interpreted in order to determine which response to them would be appropriate, and that understanding one's friendship as undemanding is one valid interpretation of the value of friendship. Subsequently, I demonstrate that this solution is not ad hoc, because friendship is not the only complex value that needs to be interpreted.
Keywords appropriate responses  associative duties  complex values  demandingness  friendship  interpretation  special duties  undemanding friendships  value
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/theo.12130
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 48,902
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
Partiality.Simon Keller - 2013 - Princeton University Press.
Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
Virtue, Vice and Value.Thomas Hurka - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):413-415.
The Justification of Associative Duties.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):28-55.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Responding Appropriately to the Impersonal Good.Jörg Löschke - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):701-714.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Source and Robustness of Duties of Friendship.Robbie Arrell - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (2):166-183.
Spinoza on Friendship.Frank Lucash - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):305-317.
The Friendship Model of Filial Obligations.Nicholas Dixon - 1995 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (1):77-87.
Confucius and Aristotle on the Goods of Friendship.Eric C. Mullis - 2010 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9 (4):391-405.
Rethinking Confucian Friendship.Xiufen Lu - 2010 - Asian Philosophy 20 (3):225-245.
The Justification of Associative Duties.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (1):28-55.
Friendship.A. C. Grayling - 2013 - Yale University Press.
Plato's Account of Friendship.Catherine Ann Ludlum - 1993 - Dissertation, Northwestern University
The Ethics of Faculty-Student Friendships.Peter L. Hagen - 2001 - Teaching Philosophy 24 (1):1-18.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-08-30

Total views
48 ( #190,483 of 2,309,951 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #127,766 of 2,309,951 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature