History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (2):177-93 (2013)

Authors
Huaping Lu-Adler
Georgetown University
Abstract
I defend the thesis that Kantian analytic judgments are about objects (as opposed to concepts) against two challenges raised by recent scholars. First, can it accommodate cases like “A two-sided polygon is two-sided”, where no object really falls under the subject-concept as Kant sees it? Second, is it compatible with Kant’s view that analytic judgments make no claims about objects in the world and that we can know them to be true without going beyond the given concepts? I address these challenges in two steps. First, given Kant’s distinction between an object in general = x from an object of sensible intuition, I argue that analytic judgments are about objects in the former sense, no matter whether the purported objects can be given in our intuition. Second, using Kant’s method of representing certain logical relations of concepts with such figures as circles, I construct a model to show that analytic truths are truths about objects in general = x and yet can be determined solely by the intensional relation between the given concepts plus certain Kantian-logical laws. Analytic truths are thus shown as formal in the Kantian sense that they do not presuppose the purported objects as givable in our intuition. This account of the formality of analytic truths captures Kant’s diagnosis of the Leibnizian illusion that we can make material claims about the world by analytically true judgments.
Keywords analytic judgment  formal truth  Kant
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Henry E. Allison - 1988 - Yale University Press.
Lectures on Logic.Immanuel KANT - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Kant’s Conception of Logical Extension and Its Implications.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2012 - Dissertation, University of California, Davis
Analyticity.George Bealer - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 234-9.
Kant’s Conception of Analytic Judgment.Ian Proops - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):588–612.
Metaphysical Motives of Kant's Analytic–Synthetic Distinction.Desmond Hogan - 2013 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (2):267-307.
Kant on Truth-Aptness.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):109-126.
Kant und die Logik des "Ich denke".Tim Henning - 2010 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3):331-356.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-07-06

Total views
572 ( #11,617 of 2,438,839 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
43 ( #16,886 of 2,438,839 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes