Mind-body identity and irreducible properties

Philosophy Research Archives 4:196-246 (1978)
Abstract
The identity theory, advocated as a solution to the mind-body problem by materialists such as Feigl and Smart, has been criticized for implying the existence of irreducible properties. After summarizing the relevant theses of materialism, I consider several versions of the irreducible properties objection, and argue that they are all unsuccessful.
Keywords Body  Identity Theory  Metaphysics  Minds
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ISBN(s) 0164-0771
DOI 10.5840/pra1978410
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