British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (August):155-6 (1967)
We can imagine a human operator playing a game of one-upmanship against a programmed computer. If the program is Fn, the human operator can print the theorem Gn, which the programmed computer, or, if you prefer, the program, would never print, if it is consistent. This is true for each whole number n, but the victory is a hollow one since a second computer, loaded with program C, could put the human operator out of a job.... It is useless for the `mentalist' to argue that any given program can always be improves since the process for improving programs can presumably be programmed also; certainly this can be done if the mentalist describes how the improvement is to be made. If he does give such a description, then he has not made a case
|Keywords||Epistemology Machine Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Reprint years||1968, 1969|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Machine Understanding and the Chinese Room.Natika Newton - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):207-15.
Mind, Machine and Morality: Toward a Philosophy of Human-Technology Symbiosis.Peter A. Hancock - 2009 - Ashgate.
The Angel in the Machine.Jean-Pierre Schachter - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:445-460.
Asimov's “Three Laws of Robotics” and Machine Metaethics.Susan Leigh Anderson - 2008 - AI and Society 22 (4):477-493.
What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem.John L. Pollock - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):237–309.
Massively Parallel Distributed Processing and a Computationalist Foundation for Cognitive Science.Albert E. Lyngzeidetson - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (March):121-127.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads105 ( #47,561 of 2,168,644 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #346,816 of 2,168,644 )
How can I increase my downloads?