Satan stultified: A rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf

The Monist 52 (1):145-58 (1968)
Abstract
The argument is a dialectical one. It is not a direct proof that the mind is something more than a machine, but a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanism that may be put forward. If the mechanist maintains any specific thesis, I show that [146] a contradiction ensues. But only if. It depends on the mechanist making the first move and putting forward his claim for inspection. I do not think Benacerraf has quite taken the point. He criticizes me both for "failing to notice" that my ability to show that the Gödel sentence of a formal system is true "depends very much on how he is given
Keywords Epistemology  Mechanism  Benacerraf, P  Goedel
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ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist196852111
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Minds, Machines and Self-Reference.Peter Slezak - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (1):17-34.

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