The Monist 52 (1):145-58 (1968)
The argument is a dialectical one. It is not a direct proof that the mind is something more than a machine, but a schema of disproof for any particular version of mechanism that may be put forward. If the mechanist maintains any specific thesis, I show that  a contradiction ensues. But only if. It depends on the mechanist making the first move and putting forward his claim for inspection. I do not think Benacerraf has quite taken the point. He criticizes me both for "failing to notice" that my ability to show that the Gödel sentence of a formal system is true "depends very much on how he is given
|Keywords||Epistemology Mechanism Benacerraf, P Goedel|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Consistency, Mechanicalness, and the Logic of the Mind.Q. Yu - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):145-79.
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