Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics

Noûs 41 (3):355–393 (2007)
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Abstract

This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.

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2009-01-28

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Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

Proxy Agency in Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Noûs 48 (1):75-105.
Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
The collective moral autonomy thesis.David Copp - 2007 - Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (3):369–388.
Interacting mindreaders.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.Adam Smith - 1976 - Oxford University Press. Edited by R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner & W. B. Todd.
Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

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