From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I

Oxford University Press UK (2016)
Authors
Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington
Abstract
Kirk Ludwig develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. Part I develops the event analysis of action sentences, provides an account of the content of individual intentions, and on that basis an analysis of individual intentional action. Part II shows how to extend the account to collective action, intentional and unintentional, and shared intention, expressed in sentences with plural subjects. On the account developed, collective action is a matter of there being multiple agents of an event and it requires no group agents per se. Shared intention is a matter of agents in a group each intending that they bring about some end in accordance with a shared plan. Thus their participatory intentions differ from individual intentions not in their mode but in their content. Joint intentional action then is a matter of a group of individuals successfully executing a shared intention.
Keywords Collective Action  Shared Intention  We-intentions
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ISBN(s) 9780198755623
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Shared Intention is Not Joint Commitment.Matthew Kopec & Seumas Miller - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13:179-189.

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