Foundations of Social Reality in Collective Intentional Behavior

In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology (2007)
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Abstract

This paper clarifies Searle's account of we-intentions and then argues that it is subject to counterexamples, some of which are derived from examples Searle uses against other accounts. It then offers an alternative reductive account that is not subject to the counterexamples.

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Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

Social cognition in the we-mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris D. Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
Proxy Agency in Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Noûs 48 (1):75-105.
There are No Primitive We-Intentions.Alessandro Salice - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.

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References found in this work

The logical form of action sentences.Donald Davidson - 1967 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 81--95.
Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.
Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
The Construction of Social Reality.John Searle - 1995 - Philosophy 71 (276):313-315.

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