Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):427-445 (2010)
I address a criticism of the use of thought experiments in conceptual analysis advanced on the basis of the survey method of so-called experimental philosophy. The criticism holds that surveys show that intuitions are relative to cultures in a way that undermines the claim that intuition-based investigation yields any objective answer to philosophical questions. The crucial question is what intuitions are as philosophers have been interested in them. To answer this question we look at the role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry. When we have done this, we can see that it is impossible for intuitions properly understood to be relative in the way that has been suggested as they are conceived of as expressions of competence in the concepts deployed in their contents. The remaining methodological issues, though not to be dismissed, present no in principle objection to the method of thought experiments.
|Keywords||Intuitions Experimental Philosophy Conceptual Analysis Thought Experiments|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry.Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) - 1998 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style.Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2004 - Cognition 92 (3):1-12.
Citations of this work BETA
The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy.David Rose & David Danks - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.
Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?Andow James - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):515-538.
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Similar books and articles
Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.
Psychology and the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy.Brian Talbot - 2009 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):157-176.
Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions.Joel Pust - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):227 - 258.
Intuitions in Science: Thought Experiments as Argument Pumps.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2014 - In Anthony R. Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press. pp. 119-134.
Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth.Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.
The Role of Theory Contamination in Intuitions.James McBain - 1999 - Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):197-204.
Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments.Elke Brendel - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):89–108.
Added to index2010-08-19
Total downloads171 ( #26,506 of 2,163,682 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #30,929 of 2,163,682 )
How can I increase my downloads?