Intuitions and relativity

Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):427-445 (2010)
Abstract
I address a criticism of the use of thought experiments in conceptual analysis advanced on the basis of the survey method of so-called experimental philosophy. The criticism holds that surveys show that intuitions are relative to cultures in a way that undermines the claim that intuition-based investigation yields any objective answer to philosophical questions. The crucial question is what intuitions are as philosophers have been interested in them. To answer this question we look at the role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry. When we have done this, we can see that it is impossible for intuitions properly understood to be relative in the way that has been suggested as they are conceived of as expressions of competence in the concepts deployed in their contents. The remaining methodological issues, though not to be dismissed, present no in principle objection to the method of thought experiments.
Keywords Intuitions  Experimental Philosophy  Conceptual Analysis  Thought Experiments
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2010.505877
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point.R. M. Hare (ed.) - 1981 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?James Andow - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):515-538.
Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.

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