Erkenntnis 81 (6):1253-1272 (2016)

Authors
David Ludwig
Wageningen University and Research
Abstract
The aim of this article is to argue that ontological choices in scientific practice undermine common formulations of the value-free ideal in science. First, I argue that the truth values of scientific statements depend on ontological choices. For example, statements about entities such as species, race, memory, intelligence, depression, or obesity are true or false relative to the choice of a biological, psychological, or medical ontology. Second, I show that ontological choices often depend on non-epistemic values. On the basis of these premises, I argue that it is often neither possible nor desirable to evaluate scientific statements independently of non-epistemic values. Finally, I suggest that considerations of ontological choices do not only challenge the value-free ideal but also help to specify positive roles of non-epistemic values in an often neglected area of scientific practice.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-015-9793-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,241
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Natural Kindness.Matthew Slater - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):375-411.
Science in a Democratic Society.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101:95-112.

View all 63 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice.Simon Lohse - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (1):3-27.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Freedom of Will and the Value of Choice.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (2):256-284.
Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
University Collections as Archives of Scientific Practice -.David Ludwig & Cornelia Weber - 2013 - Revista Electrónica de Fuentes y Archivosmore 4.
Disagreement in Scientific Ontologies.David Ludwig - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (1):1-13.
Why Science Cannot Be Value-Free.Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik - 2010 - Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (1):33-41.
Are There Ontological Explanations?Erik Weber - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):277-283.
Free Will: A Very Short Introduction.Thomas Pink - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models.Sven Diekmann & Martin Peterson - 2013 - Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):207-218.
State of the Field: Transient Underdetermination and Values in Science.Justin Biddle - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):124-133.
Facts, Values and Moral Realism.David Schejbal - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
On the False Ontological Consensus.Mudyń Krzysztof - 2015 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 46 (2):160-173.
Whence Ontological Structural Realism?Juha Saatsi - 2008 - In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. pp. 255--265.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-12-05

Total views
26 ( #373,791 of 2,325,377 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #451,872 of 2,325,377 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes