In Sara Chant Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press (2014)

Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington
What is the ontology of collective action? I have in mind three connected questions. 1. Do the truth conditions of action sentences about groups require there to be group agents over and above individual agents? 2. Is there a difference, in this connection, between action sentences about informal groups that use plural noun phrases, such as ‘We pushed the car’ and ‘The women left the party early’, and action sentences about formal or institutional groups that use singular noun phrases, such as ‘The United States declared war on Japan on December 8th, 1941’ and ‘The Supreme Court ruled that segregation is unconstitutional in 1954 in Brown vs. Board of Education’? 3. Under what conditions does it make sense to speak of a group doing something together, and what, if anything, is a collective action? In this paper, I argue that a) understanding action sentences about groups does not commit us to the existence of group agents per se, but only to the existence of individual agents; b) there is no difference in this regard between sentences which attribute actions to informal groups on the one hand and institutional groups on the other; c) collective action can be both intentional and unintentional; d) any random group of agents each of whom does something is also a group which does something together; e) while there is a sense in which groups per se perform no primitive collective actions, and therefore no actions at all, f) there is a sensible extension of talk of actions to groups, though it should be treated strictly speaking, like talk of group agents, as a façon de parler, for g) the only agents per se are individuals and the only actions are theirs. -/-
Keywords Collective Action  Social Ontology  Institutional Agency
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Collective Memory.Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton - 2017 - In M. Jankovic & K. Ludwig (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. Routledge. pp. 140-151.
Intellectualism and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):1-9.
The Metaphysics of Practical Rationality: Intentional and Deontic Cognition.Preston Stovall - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (4):1-20.
Shared Agency in Modest Sociality.Kirk Ludwig - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):7-15.
Agency as Difference-Making: Causal Foundations of Moral Responsibility.Johannes Himmelreich - 2015 - Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science

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