Semantics for opaque contexts

Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):141-66 (1998)
Abstract
In this paper, we outline an approach to giving extensional truth-theoretic semantics for what have traditionally been seen as opaque sentential contexts. We outline an approach to providing a compositional truth-theoretic semantics for opaque contexts which does not require quantifying over intensional entities of any kind, and meets standard objections to such accounts. The account we present aims to meet the following desiderata on a semantic theory T for opaque contexts: (D1) T can be formulated in a first-order extensional language; (D2) T does not require quantification over intensional entities­i.e., meanings, propositions, properties, relations, or the like­in its treatment of opaque contexts; (D3) T captures the entailment relations that hold in virtue of form between sentences in the language for which it is a theory; (D4) T has a finite number of axioms. If the approach outlined here is correct, it resolves a longstanding complex of problems in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language.
Keywords Propositional Attitudes  Intensional Contexts  Sententialism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Quotation.Paul Saka - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):935-949.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
149 ( #32,727 of 2,193,769 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
51 ( #2,677 of 2,193,769 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature