MIT Press (2004)

Authors
Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
Abstract
The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
Keywords Ability  Consciousness  Epiphenomenalism  Epistemology  Knowledge  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Physicalism  Qualia  Jackson, F
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ISBN(s) 9780262621892   0262621894     0262122723
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Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.
I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119-150.

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