- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument
MIT Press (2004)
Abstract
The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.Author Profiles
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Chapters
Example: The Captive Scientist. 1 Mary, a brilliant scientist, has lived from birth in a cell where everything is black or white.(Even she herself is painted all over.) She views the world on black-and-white television. By television she reads books, she joins in discussion, she watches the results of experiments done under her direction. In this way she becomes the. [REVIEW] (pages 77)David Lewis
about other people (because she learns something about them on her release). 3. There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist story. Regimenting further, for clarity's sake, yields the following. [REVIEW] (pages 163)Paul M. Churchland
The knowledge argument can be introduced through a variety of differ-ent illustrations. Here are three.(i) Consider a complete physical theory of the light spectrum, including the effects different wavelengths of light have on the neural systems of humans. There are also the phenomenal properties we experience when we. [REVIEW] (pages 179)John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter
Similar books and articles
Review of P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa & D. Stoljar, There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. [REVIEW]Torin Alter - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
Postscript on Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar, There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 417-420.
20 Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar, There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 421.
So many ways of saying no to Mary.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar, There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
12 What Mary Couldn't Know: Belief About Phenomenal States.Martine Nida-Riimelin - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar, There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 241.
about other people (because she learns something about them on her release). 3. There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist story. Regimenting further, for clarity's sake, yields the following. [REVIEW]Paul M. Churchland - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar, There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 163.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
831 (#33,213)
6 months
42 (#113,788)
2009-01-28
Downloads
831 (#33,213)
6 months
42 (#113,788)
Historical graph of downloads
Author Profiles
Citations of this work
The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.
I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119-150.
Kripke's knowledge argument against materialism.Adriana Renero - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):370-387.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6dc498764b-td4v8 uwo