MIT Press (2004)
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| Abstract |
The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
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| Keywords | Ability Consciousness Epiphenomenalism Epistemology Knowledge Metaphysics Phenomena Physicalism Qualia Jackson, F |
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| ISBN(s) | 9780262621892 0262621894 0262122723 |
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Chapters BETA
The Knowledge Argument Can Be Introduced Through a Variety of Differ-Ent Illustrations. Here Are Three.(I) Consider a Complete Physical Theory of the Light Spectrum, Including the Effects Different Wavelengths of Light Have on the Neural Systems of Humans. There Are Also the Phenomenal Properties We Experience When We. [REVIEW]John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter
About Other People (Because She Learns Something About Them on Her Release). 3. There Are Truths About Other People (and Herself) Which Escape the Physicalist Story. Regimenting Further, for Clarity's Sake, Yields the Following. [REVIEW]Paul M. Churchland
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Citations of this work BETA
The Semantics of ‘What It’s Like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.
I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119-150.
Philosophical Problems, Cluster Concepts, and the Many Lives of Molyneux’s Question.Brian R. Glenney - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):541-558.
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