Kant's fact of reason as source of normativity
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):596 – 608 (2009)
Abstract
In _The Sources of Normativity_, Christine M. Korsgaard argues that unconditional obligation can be accounted for in terms of practical identity. My argument in this paper is that practical identity cannot play this foundational role. More specifically, I interpret Korsgaard's argument as beginning with something analogous to Kant's fact of reason, viz. with the fact that our minds are reflective. I then try to show that her determination of this fact is inadequate and that this causes the argument concerning practical identity to fail. Finally, I argue that a conception of the fact of reason more in line with what I take to be Kant's own is necessary to account for unconditional obligation.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1080/00201740903377867
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Citations of this work
¿Solo hay realismo o constructivismo moral dentro del neokantismo contemporáneo? Notas para una fundamentación moral kantiana con base en la idea de libertad.Martín Fleitas González - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (159):131-153.
Does Contemporary Neo-Kantianism Only Allow for Moral Realism or Constructivism? Elements for a Kantian Grounding of Morality Solely on the basis of the Idea of Freedom.Martín Fleitas González - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (159):131-153.
Kant, y la polémica entre el constructivismo y el realismo. Reflexiones para un enfoque kantiano-constitutivista del dilema de Eutifrón.Martín Fleitas González - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 52:117-150.
References found in this work
The Fact of Reason. Kant’s Passage to Ordinary Moral Knowledge.Paweł Łuków - 1993 - Kant Studien 84 (2):204-221.