Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):123-138 (2013)

Stefan Lukits
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Against Thomas Mormann's argument that differential topology does not support Carnap's conventionalism in geometry we show their compatibility. However, Mormann's emphasis on the entanglement that characterizes topology and its associated metrics is not misplaced. It poses questions about limits of empirical inquiry. For Carnap, to pose a question is to give a statement with the task of deciding its truth. Mormann's point forces us to introduce more clarity to what it means to specify the task that decides between competing hypotheses and in what way such a task may be both in practice and/or in principle impossible to carry out
Keywords conventionalism  Rudolf Carnap  Thomas Mormann  limitation of scientific inquiry  ignorabimus  philosophy of geometry
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1163/9789401210508_007
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 286-298.

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