Acta Analytica 35 (1):129-146 (2020)

Authors
Peter Lukan
University of Ljubljana
Abstract
In this article, I first give a short outline of the different interpretations of the concept of probability that emerged in the twentieth century. In what follows, I give an overview of the main problems and problematic concepts from the philosophy of probability and show how they relate to Bayesian inference. In this overview, I emphasise that the understanding of the main concepts related to different interpretations of probability influences the understanding and status of Bayesian inference. In the conclusion, I express that, from a broad epistemological point of view, a kind of compatibilism between the two main lines of interpretations of probability is worth pursuing, as they represent different aspects of the epistemological process.
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-019-00390-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.Isaac Levi & James M. Joyce - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (7):387.
The Objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):539-558.
Probability and the Weighing of Evidence.I. J. Good - 1950 - Philosophy 26 (97):163-164.

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