Blum’s Puzzle and the Analiticity of Kripkean Identity Statements

Acta Analytica 34 (1):9-14 (2019)

Authors
Laureano Luna
National Distance Education University (PhD)
Abstract
We rely on a recent puzzle by Alex Blum to offer a new argument for the old Fitch’s thesis that what we learn a posteriori in Kripkean identity statements like ‘Tully is Cicero’ is contingent and what is not contingent in such statements is analytical, hence hardly a posteriori.
Keywords identity statements  rigid designators  direct designators  a posteriori  de re  modal axiom schema K
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-018-0346-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,566
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Frege's Puzzle.Graeme Forbes & Nathan Salmon - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.
Can It Be That Tully=Cicero?Alex Blum - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):149-150.
Are There Necessary a Posteriori Truths?G. W. Fitch - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (4):243 - 247.
On Kripke and Statements.G. W. Fitch - 2004 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):295–308.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity.Emmett L. Holman - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-429.
Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity.Emmett L. Holman - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-429.
Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity.Emmett L. Holman - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29.
How Not to Preserve Kripke's Fundamental Insight.William Carter - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):99-108.
Kripke's Fregean Argument Against Materialism.Paul Inman Coppock - 1982 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Fictionalism and the Informativeness of Identity.Kroon Frederick - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):197 - 225.
Troubles with Direct Reference.Pierre Baumann - 2012 - Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 93:33-51.
Number Words and Reference to Numbers.Katharina Felka - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):261-282.
Free Will and Contextualism.Steven Rieber - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223-252.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-04-15

Total views
13 ( #546,751 of 2,325,872 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #269,290 of 2,325,872 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature