The Monist 96 (2):295-308 (2013)

Laureano Luna
National Distance Education University (PhD)
The Monist’s call for papers for this issue ended: “if formalism is true, then it must be possible in principle to mechanize meaning in a conscious thinking and language-using machine; if intentionalism is true, no such project is intelligible”. We use the Grelling-Nelson paradox to show that natural language is indefinitely extensible, which has two important consequences: it cannot be formalized and model theoretic semantics, standard for formal languages, is not suitable for it. We also point out that object-object mapping theories of semantics, the usual account for the possibility of non intentional semantics, doesn’t seem able to account for the indefinitely extensible productivity of natural language.
Keywords natural language  formalization  indefinite extensibility.  universe of discourse  semantics
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Reprint years 2013, 2014
ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist201396211
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References found in this work BETA

On Notation for Ordinal Numbers.S. C. Kleene - 1938 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 3 (4):150-155.
All Things Indefinitely Extensible.Stewart Shapiro & Crispin Wright - 2006 - In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), ¸ Iterayo&Uzquiano:Ag. Clarendon Press. pp. 255--304.
Context and Unrestricted Quantification.Michael Glanzberg - 2006 - In A. Rayo & G. Uzquiano (eds.), Absolute Generality. Oxford University Press. pp. 45--74.
What is a Truth Value And How Many Are There?Roy T. Cook - 2009 - Studia Logica 92 (2):183-201.

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