physicalism, truth, and the Pinocchio paradox

Mind and Matter 14 (1):77-86 (2016)

Authors
Laureano Luna
National Distance Education University (PhD)
Abstract
We develop an argument sketched by Luna (2011) based on the Pinocchio paradox, which was proposed by Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge- Smith (2010). We show that, upon plausible assumptions, the claim that mental states supervene on bodily states leads to the conclusion that some proposition is both paradoxical and not paradoxical. In order to show how the presence of paradoxes can be harnessed for philosophical argumentation, we present as well a couple of related arguments.
Keywords Pinocchio paradox  M-physicalism  Supervenience  Physical  Empirical  Truth  Indefinite Extensibility
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