Reasoning from paradox

The Reasoner 5 (2):22-23 (2011)
Godel's and Tarski's theorems were inspired by paradoxes: the Richard paradox, the Liar. Godel, in the 1951 Gibbs lecture argued from his metatheoretical results for a metaphysical claim: the impossibility of reducing, both, mathematics to the knowable by the human mind and the human mind to a finite machine (e.g. the brain). So Godel reasoned indirectly from paradoxes for metaphysical theses. I present four metaphysical theses concerning mechanism, reductive physicalism and time for the only purpose of suggesting how it could be argued for them directly from paradoxical sentences.
Keywords Paradoxical sentence  The Pinocchio paradox  Benardete's paradox  Yablo's paradox
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