The 'practical turn' and the convergence of traditions

Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):10 – 27 (1998)

Abstract
This paper explores the idea that the structure of intentionality is fundamentally the structure of a practice, not the structure of a language, or some quasi-linguistic system of representational entities. I show how and why neo-Fregean theory of content is committed to this practical turn. Mis-representation is often thought to be problematic for the neo-Fregean, but I show not only that it accommodates the phenomena better than the representationalist position, but also that the idea of error that the representationalist wants with empty singular terms is redundant, for it has no role to play in explaining the systematicity of thought.
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DOI 10.1080/10001998018538687
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Logical Investigations.Edmund Husserl & J. N. Findlay - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):384-398.

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Cognitive Dynamics and Indexicals.Simon Prosser - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (4):369–391.

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