Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):281 – 295 (2005)
In this essay I explore one way of making sense of the idea that 'judgement' picks out a singular cognitive operation that cannot be modelled in terms of rule application. I argue that there is a place for noting a distinctive capacity for coming to a view about what to think and what to do and that this capacity is best understood in terms of singular attentional states. On the account that I sketch, the role of judgement contributes to the metaphysics of reasoning, not to a debate within the logic of reasons. The role of judgement is not concerned with particularist versus generalist debates about the nature of reasons; it is concerned with getting right the metaphysics of agency in reasoning.
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