Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394 (2006)
In early essays and in more recent work, Fred Dretske argues against the closure of perception, perceptual knowledge, and knowledge itself. In this essay I review his case and suggest that, in a useful sense, perception is closed, and that, while perceptual knowledge is not closed under entailment, perceptually based knowledge is closed, and so is knowledge itself. On my approach, which emphasizes the safe indication account of knowledge, we can both perceive, and know, that sceptical scenarios (such as being a brain in a vat) do not hold.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Information Closure and the Sceptical Objection.Luciano Floridi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1037-1050.
Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector‐Kelly - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.
Similar books and articles
Skepticism, Information, and Closure: Dretske's Theory of Knowledge.Christoph Jäger - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):187 - 201.
Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure.Fred Dretske - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 13-26.
Information, Closure, and Knowledge: On Jäger's Objection to Dretske.P. Baumann - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (3):403 - 408.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads141 ( #33,543 of 2,168,955 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #61,130 of 2,168,955 )
How can I increase my downloads?