Dretske on knowledge closure

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394 (2006)
Abstract
In early essays and in more recent work, Fred Dretske argues against the closure of perception, perceptual knowledge, and knowledge itself. In this essay I review his case and suggest that, in a useful sense, perception is closed, and that, while perceptual knowledge is not closed under entailment, perceptually based knowledge is closed, and so is knowledge itself. On my approach, which emphasizes the safe indication account of knowledge, we can both perceive, and know, that sceptical scenarios (such as being a brain in a vat) do not hold.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400600895862
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

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Citations of this work BETA
Why Safety Doesn't Save Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):127-142.
Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector‐Kelly - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.
The Discrimination Argument Revisited.Simon Dierig - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):73-92.
Moore's Missing Principle.Steven Luper - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):151-161.

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