In defense of wordless thoughts about thoughts

Mind and Language 22 (3):270–296 (2007)
Abstract
Bermúdez (2003) argues that (T1) nonlinguistic creatures can think thoughts about protocausal conditional states of affairs and engage in rudimentary forms of reasoning, but (T2) they cannot ‘in principle’ think thoughts about thoughts (propositions)—in particular, they cannot have higher-order propositional attitudes (PAs). I reconstruct Bermúdez’s argument for T2 and show that it rests upon an implausible empirical assumption and is, therefore, not a threat to current empirical research into nonlinguistic higher-order PAs. I argue that even on an interpretation of the argument that would pose a threat to this research, a parallel argument would seem to disprove T1. Finally, I argue that on an interpretation of Bermúdez’s argument that would not pose a threat to the above empirical research but would still present a significant philosophical thesis about thought and language, the argument either appears to confuse thoughts with their representational vehicles or the representational vehicles of thoughts with those representations used to hold thoughts in mind
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00309.x
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References found in this work BETA
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Image and Mind.Stephen M. Kosslyn - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Force-Field Puzzle and Mindreading in Non-Human Primates.José Luis Bermúdez - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):397-410.

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