Gesetze des Denkens? Von Husserls und Freges Psychologismus-Kritik zu einem transzendentalen Kern der Logik

Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (4):514-531 (2020)
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Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at first appears to make the idea of the necessity of logical laws even less plausible, but eventually turns out to speak in favor of this view.

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David Löwenstein
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

Citations of this work

Gottlob Frege: Ist Wahrheit definierbar?David Löwenstein - 2021 - Zeitschrift Für Didaktik der Philosophie Und Ethik 4:73-79.

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