David Löwenstein
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at first appears to make the idea of the necessity of logical laws even less plausible, but eventually turns out to speak in favor of this view.
Keywords Gottlob Frege  Edmund Husserl  Psychologism  Logical Necessity  Normativity of Logic  Transcendental Arguments  Willard Van Orman Quine  Holism
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DOI 10.3196/004433020830955969
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References found in this work BETA

Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Logische Untersuchungen.Edmund Husserl (ed.) - 1900 - Felix Meiner Verlag.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.

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Citations of this work BETA

Gottlob Frege: Ist Wahrheit definierbar?David Löwenstein - 2021 - Zeitschrift Für Didaktik der Philosophie Und Ethik 4:73-79.

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