Authors
David Löwenstein
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Abstract
The distinction between knowing how to do something and knowing that something is the case is a piece of common sense. Still, it has been suggested that one of these concepts can be reduced to the other one. Intellectualists like Jason Stanley (2011) try to reduce know-how to propositional knowledge, while practicalists like Stephen Hetherington (2011) try to reduce propositional knowledge to know-how. I argue that both reductionist programs fail because they make the manifestations of the knowledge to be reduced unintelligible. Contrary to both, I suggest that know-how and propositional knowledge are distinct, but conceptually interdependent.
Keywords Knowledge How  Know-how  Skill  Intellectualism  Practicalism
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References found in this work BETA

Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.Gilbert Ryle - 1946 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46:1 - 16.
Knowledge, Perception, and Memory.Don Locke - 1976 - Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):279-280.

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Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
A Dispositional Account of Practical Knowledge.Constantin Jan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2309-2329.
Concepts and Action. Know-How and Beyond.David Löwenstein - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion. New Essays. London, Ontario, Kanada: Routledge. pp. 181-198.
Gilbert Ryle’s Adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):318-335.

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